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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah u•., u.
NEW PARK MINING COMPANY and
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellants,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
OF
UTAH and LLOYD REMUND,
Minor son of CHARLES L. REMUND, Deceased,
Respondents.

Case No.
8121

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
PETER M. LOWE,
Deputy Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent, Industrial Commission of Utah.
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE,
ANDREW R. HURLEY,
Attorneys for Respondent, Lloyd
Remund, Minor son of CHARLES
L. REMUND, Deceased.
ARROW PRESS, SALT LAKS
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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
NEW PARK MINING COMPANY and
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellants,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
OF
UTAH and LLOYD REMUND,
Minor son of CHARLES L. REMUND, Deceased,
Respondents.

Case No.

8121

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Respondents agree to the statement of facts as set forth
in Appellants' Brief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
WHERE COMPENSATION FOR DEATH WAS
AWARDED TO A DEPENDENT WIFE AND
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CHILD, THE RE-MARRIAGE OF THE WIFE
AFTER THE CHILD REACHED EIGHTEEN
YEARS DOES NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF THE
BALANCE OF COMPENSATION PAYABLE
UNDER THE ORIGINAL AWARD, LESS THE
LUMP SUM PAYABLE TO THE WIFE.

ARGUMENT
Since the Order of the Industrial Commission clearly
sets forth the reasoning surrounding the award in this
case, we respectfully suggest that the Court consider it as
a part of this Brief. The Commission's Order (R. 6, 7 &
8) sets forth the rule that the basic award does not terminate when the last minor reaches the age of eighteen. It is
interesting to note that this interpretation by the Industrial
Commission has continued without interruption since the
passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We must
assume, therefore, that the Legislature is cognizant of the
practice and has chosen not to legislate against it. This is
contrary to the rule in approximately twenty jurisdictions
throughout the United States, wherein the Legislatures have
set by specific statutory enactment an age limit at which
compensation lapses. See the compilation of jurisdictions
having this rule as set forth in LARSON'S THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Table 15.
The sole question of importance in this case is whether
or not compensation having once vested may be divested
as the last dependent reaches eighteen, by an inference.
Respondents submit that it is patent that the inference
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must be clear and convincing and such that reasonable
minds cannot differ. Had the Legislature ignored the
problem completely, Respondents submit that Appellants'
position would have some merit; but where the Legislature
has recognized the problem and has dealt with it in a
manner other than that desired by Appellants, the case
against them becomes increasingly strong.
Respondents have no doubts whatever that an award
may be changed or reduced after the original Order, our
Legislation is clear on this point. Respondents do, however,
contend that the change or reduction must be in strict accordance with our statutes and not a matter of inference,
speculation or conjecture.
To accomplish their purpose, Appellants have tortured
the plain meaning of the various statutory provisions by
selecting those portions of the statutes in accord with their
theory and disregarding that portion of the statute which
orients the section in the legislative plan. Our Court has
dealt with a similar problem in Silver-King Coalition Company, et al. v. The Industrial Commission, 116 P. (2d) 771,
wherein the section that was then 42-1-64 (2) U. C. A.
1943, and is now 35-1-68 (2) U. C. A. 1953, was being attacked on the ground that the statute gave to two minor dependents a larger weekly compensation rate than it would
give to a widow and one minor dependent. The Appellants
contend that logical interpretation would require the additional 10% be given only where there is an adult dependent in addition to minor children and that where there
was no adult dependent, the 10% should commence with
the second minor child rather than the first. This Court in
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that case rejected the contention upon the plain reading of
the statute, or, as was succinctly summarized by Justice
Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in Johanson et ux v. Cudahy
Packing Company, 120 P. (2) 281, 284:
"In Silver-King Coalition Company vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 116 P. (2) 771, it was
stated that where there was no ambiguity and it was
not necessary to save the constitutionality or prevent
absurdity, the language should be construed to mean
exactly what it says."
Section 35-1-71 is set forth as follows:
"35-1-71. DEPENDENTS - PRESUMPTION.
-The following persons shall be presumed to be
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
"(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she
lives at the time of his death.
" ( 2) Children under the age of eighteen years
or over such age, if physically or mentally incapacitated, upon the parent, with whom they are living at
the time of the death of such parent, or who is legally bound for their support.
"In all other cases, the question of dependency,
in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing
at the time of the injury resulting in the death of
such employee, but no person shall be considered as
dependent unless he is a member of the family of
the deceased employee, or bears to him the relation
of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or
brother or sister. The word 'child' as used in this
title shall include a posthumous child, and a child
legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers
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5
and half sisters shall be included in the words
'brother or sister' as above used."
This section of the Workmen's Compensation Act has
been subjected to a great deal of interpretation. The Court
most recently spoke on this section in Early, et al. v. Industrial Commission, et al., 265 P. (2) 390, where it was
held that the dependency provision set forth in sub-section
(2) and inferentially sub-section (1), create a conclusive
presumption of dependency, the other factors contained
therein being satisfied. Contained within both of these subsections are the words with whom she (or they) are living
with AT THE TIME OF DEATH. The remainder of the
sub-section dealing with non-presumptive dependents determines the question of dependency at the time of the INJURY RESULTING IN DEATH. The reason for the difference in the time of determining dependency, injury or
death, is beyond the scope of this case, but needless to say
this subject has received the attention of this and other
Courts time and time again. Timewise, it is well settled
that the question of dependency is determined at the time of
death, or, at the time of the injury resulting in death. This
is an inherent and necessary interpretation of our statute.
See: Globe Grain & Milling Company, et al., v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 193 P. 642, cited by Appellants for
other purposes.
Appellants now say that we have a re-determination
of the question of dependency when the last minor reaches
eighteen and as authority for the proposition cite the
statute referred to supra, which by an inseparable part
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thereof refers us back to the date of death or to the date
of injury resulting in death. This is somewhat akin to the
problem of Renvoi in Conflicts of Law cases. Appellants
contend that we are required to redetermine the dependency of Lloyd Remund, yet our statute refers us back to
the date of death or to the injury resulting in death. While
an analogy to Renvoi is not technically correct, it serves
to point out the invalidity of the Appellant's contention.
The question of dependency was determined by the Industrial Commission in its Order of October 22, 1951, based
upon the circumstances of dependency existing at the time
of death. The Appellant conceded in that determination and
paid compensation thereunder. Their appeal time has run
as to the question of dependency and the Commission's
Order determining dependency is res ajudicata. Could we
transpose the date of death or the date of injury to the
time after the alleged dependent reaches eighteen years,
we would have a valid application of the statute, but that
is not the case before us.

It is not without significance that the dependency provisions of the Occupational Disease Act passed in 1941 and
set forth as 35-2-30 (b) U. C. A. 1953, is identical with the
provisions of 35-1-71 (2) with which we are concerned. Had
the Legislature intended to incorporate the theory here proposed, they had an excellent opportunity to express themselves. Instead, they adopted the theory and the language
of the similar provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act in the Occupational Disease Act.
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A divesting provision is contained in Section 35-1-73,
in that portion of the statute which is as follows:
"Should any dependent of a deceased employee
die during the period covered by SUCH WEEKLY
PAYMENTS, the right of such dependent to compensation under this title shall cease."
Applying this provision to the case at hand, Lloyd
Remund, or any other dependent for that matter, would
lose their rights to compensation upon death. The section
goes on to deal with the rights of a widow who remarries,
making provision for a lump sum cash settlement of onethird of the benefits remaining unpaid at the time of such
re-marriage and providing for the remaining two-thirds
of such benefits to such persons as the Commission may
determine for the use and benefit of other dependents.
Appellants infer that the use of the plural "dependents"
creates an inference that the single dependent if over eighteen years is to receive no further benefit. It is submitted
that the rules of statutory construction require the inclusion of the singular within the plural and that the date
of determining dependency is not the date of marriage but
the date of death or injury resulting in death.
By arguing inference, Respondents can point out that
had the Legislature intended to divest a dependent of compensation upon his reaching the age of eighteen, they
might well have at least placed him in the same category
as his mother, who on remarriage gets a one-third lump
sum cash settlement. Or, had the Legislature intended to
place some significance of the dependent reaching the age
of eighteen years, they might have required the insurer to
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pay the unexpended compensation into the special fund provided for in sub-division 1 of Section 35-1-68.
Under Appellants theory, the lever which destroys
the family unit is not the attaining of eighteen years, but
the remarriage of the mother. Compensation would continue to the family unit, to which Lloyd Remund belongs,
regardless of his age, until the mother re-marries or the
six year period runs. The Legislature by this devise intended to encourage a dependent widow to re-marry; it did
not intend to make it a device to pauperize her minor son.
The bounty of a stepfather may or may not include a stepson. Certainly, a stepfather has no legal duty to support
him. His mother deprived of independent income is unable
so to do. Lloyd Remund looks to the remainder of the
compensation award for his support and education in lieu
of that normally furnished in whole or in part by his
father.
The Legislature in considering the problem of a dependent reaching eighteen set a definite course of action
for the Industrial Commission to follow. Section 35-1-74
U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"35-1-74. INCREASE OF AWARD TO CHILDREN-EFFECT OF DEATH, MARRIAGE, MAJORITY, OR TERMINATION OF DEPENDENCY.
-In all cases where the award of compensation is
increased 5 per cent of the amount of such award for
each dependent minor child, as provided in this title,
such increase in the amount of the award shall cease
at the death, marriage, attainment of the age of
eighteen years, or termination of dependency of each
such child."
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Appellants argue in effect that the Industrial Commission should follow the 5% reduction in cases where
there are other dependents, but where, as in this case, the
sole remaining dependent reaches eighteen, instead of reducing the balance of the award 5% it is reduced 100%. It is
further argued, that since this was superimposed upon
existing law by the Legislature, this is indicative of a
legislative intent to divest compensation completely at the
age eighteen. The plain, unmistaken and untortured meaning of the Section is to eliminate the increase in the basic
award on the happening of specified events, but to leave
the basic award intact. Had the Legislature intended to
divest compensation on the attainment of a certain age, here
would be a logical place to do it. The Legislature in 1939
when they added the parent section to then 42-1-69 U. C. A.
1933 and again in 1945 when stating it as a separate section 42-1-69.10 U. C. A. 1943, had an opportunity to put
the theory of the Appellants into effect, the Legislature
did not choose to do so.
This Court in the case of Davis, et al. v. Industrial
Commission, et al., (1945) 164 P. (2) 740, in denying an
attack on the family unit doctrine, outlines a basic philosophy which we may not disregard :
"Family unit awards are, as a general rule, preferred. Section 42-1-69, U. C. A. 1943, provides that
the award shall be paid to one of the dependents for
the benefit of all dependents. There are instances
when the awards may be apportioned but such cases
are the result of special circumstances. In this case
the Commission made the usual award to the family
as a unit; such an award cannot be considered as an
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award in which each dependent has title to a fractional share. Each dependent has the same interest
and the same right to an undivided benefit in this
unit award. Every member of the family has a right
to the privilege of enjoying the standard of living
that would be afforded by the entire award. It is
apparent that the children have no divisible interest
for their marriage, becoming of age, or even death
has no effect on the unit award. Section 42-1-64 (2),
U. C. A. 1943. Certainly the rights of the three children, who are United States citizens, in this indi·
visible award cannot be affected by any act of their
alien mother unless the statute so provides. Therefore her expressing an intention to move, or her
actual moving would not affect the award to the
children. This gives rise to the question: What acts,
if any, of the mother can or may affect or operate
to reduce the amount of an award of which each
child is entitled to the full benefit? Her death would
not affect it; nor would any act she might perform
with the exception of marriage. Section 42-1-64 (2),
supra. The widow's interest in the award is intangible and indivisible except upon an event that
may or may not happen. Such interest confers on
the wi .!OW n'o ~ndependent right or interest but instead i;s rather a contingent claim or right or expectancy. This contingent right is incapable of
transfer by grant or conveyance; such an interest
is so intangible that it cannot be segregated. It
follows that this award should not be apportioned
or red r ced."
Appellants argue that the situation before us should be
treated specially and indicate that they do not attack a
situation where there are other dependents. By their theory,
lip service is given to the family unit doctrine, but we are

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

urged to treat the youngest member of the family in a
manner different than the older members.
We agree with the Appellants that the Legislature
places great importance upon the age of eighteen years.
However, the use to which the Appellants put it is entirely
out of harmony with the theory of our Act. Those minors
under the age of eighteen years have a conclusive presumption of dependency, other conditions being satisfied, their
rights to compensation vest. Appellants would have us
use the test of eighteen years to divest previously awarded
compensation. The whole of Appellants' theory is founded
on this faulty premise. It is Respondents' contention that
the Legislative policy of our Act is to put these matters at
rest and although there are specific instances where the
increases of an award may be subject to modification, the
basic award is not subject to attack. To hold otherwise
would result in constant collateral attack, as in this instance.
If the sole arguments availabk to thl-o;, Respondents
were mere administrative convenience, we?feel that this
would be sufficient to overcome a more persuasive inference than Appellants demonstrate to us. Re-determination
of: a dependency status based upon conditions subsequent
to the date of injury or death would be an eJrpensive, cumbersome process, especially to the Applicant. He is in no
position to litigate on an equal basis with Insurance Companies or self insurers. Sound legislative policy dictates
that once a dependency status has been adjudicated it cannot be terminated except by the occurrence of specified
events spelled out by statute, not by an inference.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
Re-determination of dependency upon the date of the
re-marriage could result in the vesting of compensation
benefits to those of a class who were not dependents upon
the date of death or the date of injury. The rule contended
for by the Appellants could become a two-edged sword,
persons not dependent at the date of death could become
dependent at a later date. The confusion is eliminated by
determining the dependency status at the date of death.
Appellants complain that the results of the Commission's Order are inequitable, slanting the entire argument
to the proposition that new rights have vested in Lloyd
Remund. By the Order of October 22nd, 1951, the insurer
was required to pay the sum of $8080.44 compensation to
the then dependents of the deceased. The obligation to pay
that sum has not enlarged. It is the same identical obligation. The inequity of which they complain is an inability
to escape it. Should Lloyd Remund die before realizing
all the benefits, they will escape it, but until that event
occurs there can be no change. The argument that a 17
year and 364 day old only child may come into a sum of
money as opposed to an eighteen plus year old child brings
up the fundamental inequity of any statute which places
a limitation on, or cuts off, rights. We must live with them,
they are a part of our law.
It is Respondents' contention that once compensation
has vested under our law it runs the stautory length of
time between the date of death, and not to exceed six years
after the date of injury. See 35-1-68 (2) U. C. A. 1953.
These facts are determined as of the date of the death. An
obligation, definite in time and definite in amount, is as-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
sumed by the Insurer, no more no less. When the original
award has run its course, the Legislature has made provision for additional benefits in special cases. Section 351-70 is as follows:
"35-1-70. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS IN SPECIAL CASES.-If any wholly dependent persons,
who have been receiving the benefits of this title, at
the termination of such benefits are yet in a DEPENDENT CONDITION, and under all reasonable
circumstances should be entitled to additional benefits, the industrial commission may, in its discretion,
extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability
of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall
not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed
shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in
subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68." (Emphasis
ours.)
It is significant to note that the Legislature in setting

up this provision chose to use the words "dependent condition" to describe the status of what we have been previously
calling dependents. We argue that their choice of words is
no accident, but was intentional to distinguish between dependents at the date of death or injury from persons in
need at the end of the compensation period. Even though
the children of the deceased are in needy circumstances the
Insurer is relieved of all further obligation, and the obligation is assumed by the special-fund set up by statute.
It is also interesting to note that even in cases where

there are no dependents, the employer and/ or the insurer
are required under 35-1-68(1) U. C. A. 1953 to pay the
sum of $1800.00 to support the contingent fund referred to
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supra. So we see that there can be liability without dependency. Had the Legislature intended to relieve the
employer and/ or his insurer of their specific obligation
they might well have ordered them to pay the unexpended
portion into the contingent fund.
The purpose in examining these various facets of our
law is not to digress from the problem at hand, but to put
the obligation of the Appellants in its proper perspective.
The only divesting we find is the termination occurring in
the case of the death of a dependent. The reasons for this
are historical. It is to prevent the Estate of the deceased
dependent from laying claim to the unexpended compensation benefits and destroying the family unit. The theory
of the Appellants is an attack upon the family unit doctrine.
It is submitted that under our law an amount is established
at a specified time, it is increased percentagewise by the
number of dependents, it is decreased likewise when the
dependents reach the age of eighteen, marry or die. A
lump sum may become due to a widow on re-marriage. The
last dependent's death may lessen the liability of the Insurer, but this, and only this will cut off the last dependent.
When his status as a dependent has once been determined,
subsequent events not spelled out by statute have no effect.
To hold otherwise creates a special rule. There is no necessity, nor is there any legal basis in the finest technical
sense, for a separate rule in this type of case. The Legislature gave compensation to this dependent by positive
legislative enactment, we should not divest it by inference.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Industrial
Commission in favor of Lloyd Remund and against New
Park Mining Company and Pacific Employers Insurance
Company should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
PETER M. LOWE,
Deputy Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent, Industrial Commission of Utah.
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE,
ANDREW R. HURLEY,
Attorneys for Respondent, Lloyd
Remund, Minor son of CHARLES
L. REMUND, Deceased.
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